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Using a panel of administrative Italian data (source: INPS), this paper provides new empirical 
evidence on the changes in the earnings distribution that occurred in Italy over a relatively 
long time period (1985-1996). Various statistical indicators have been used to document a 
slight, but not negligible, increase in earnings inequality. Decompositions by population 
subgroups have shed light on the underlying causes of the observed distributional changes.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent studies on earnings inequality remark that only a relatively few OECD countries 
experienced a significant increase in earnings inequality over the first half of the 1990s. 
Contrary to the fears emerging from the trends documented at the end of the 1980s, only the 
United Kingdom and the United States continued to feature persistent and strong widening 
earnings differentials throughout the 1990s (OECD, 1996). As about Italy, the prevalent 
indications coming from existing research point to a modest or negligible increase in earnings 
inequality, mainly documented on the basis of the Bank of Italy survey. 
In this paper we re-asses the case of Italy drawing on a different dataset, which covers a 
relatively longer period, from 1985 to 1996.  
The study of the earnings distribution is a fundamental part of economic enquiry, not least 
because of its relevance for a large number of decisions taken by various economic actors. 
The relative wages of different category of workers are important for such firm’s choices as 
hiring, training, investments and the like. Individual workers, too, look at wage differentials 
when deciding their human capital investments or searching for jobs in a specific occupation. 
Financial institutions often ask potential borrowers about their earnings, which assume a 
crucial role as collaterals. Needless to say, the levels and growths of individual earnings, as 
well as the distribution of these earnings, impinge on the individual’s economic well-being 
and his perception of the overall social welfare and justice in the community where s/he lives 
and works. Moreover, indicators describing the earnings evolution of different groups of 
workers, for example those employed in low-paid jobs, are of significance for public policy 
purposes. The availability of this kind of information is likely to benefit the targeting and 
efficient designing of programs aimed at reducing the impact on the individuals of adverse 
outcomes in the labour market. 
Observed earnings distributions tend to present a number of empirical regularities. Their 
density functions are always skewed to the right, asymmetric and display a long right tail and 
positive skewness measure. They are also leptokurtic and have a “fat tail”. Put in non- 
technical jargon, this means that mean earnings always exceed median earnings and the top 
percentiles of earners account for quite a disproportionate share of total earnings. Groups of 
workers homogeneous with respect to some observed traits – for instance, occupation, 
education, experience and the like – generally differ in their mean earnings and, in some 
cases, these differences are large. Earnings vary within each sub-group too, implying that 
unobserved differences also account for differential pays within observationally similar 
workers. Another observed fact is that earnings dispersion for a particular cohort of workers is 
greater among experienced workers than among workers that are at the beginning of their 
career.  
Economic theory has proposed various theoretical explanations of the observed 
regularities.
1  Some of these theories describe how workers decisions (e.g., human capital 
acquisition) and endowments (of talent, wealth, information) generate a distribution of 
individual productivities that gives rise to a distribution of earnings. Human capital theories 
focus on how workers acquire their skills and demonstrate that earnings inequality is a 
necessity in an economy where some activities require more costly investments. Other 
theoretical approaches tend to emphasise the role played by firms’ optimal decisions, as when 
efficient wage structures are those that elicit desired levels of individual productivity. Highly 
skewed earnings distributions within firms would in this case be an incentive device. On the 
other hand, not all income differences at a point in time may be justified by the underlying 
differences in productivities and investments, or felt as “just”. At the very minimum, the 
                                                 
1 See the Handbook of Income Distribution (2000)   3 
influence of luck in accounting for the large fortunes of some individuals may be recognised. 
Theoretical explanations on why earnings inequality may increase over time have also been 
put forward, emphasising the role of changes in both market forces and institutional factors. 
The links between inequality in the personal distribution of income and economic growth 
have also been addressed by recent research, challenging the conventional wisdom that 
inequality is always beneficial for economic growth.
2      
A more detailed discussion of these models is beyond the aims of this work and in the 
following pages we will mainly be in the business of providing new empirical evidence on the 
Italian earnings distribution. The basic questions we aim to answer are: To what extent does 
the Italian earnings distribution follow the empirical regularities generally observed in other 
countries? What distributional changes occurred in the Italian earnings distribution from the 
second half of the 1980s to the second half of the 1990s? How can we account for the 
observed trends?   
 
 
2.  Changes in the Italian wage distribution, 1985-1996 
 
2.1 A preliminary look  
 
For our analysis of the wage distribution in Italy we use administrative data from the 
Italian Institute for Social Security (INPS), containing information on a sample of employees 
over a period of twelve years – from 1985 up to 1996.
3 
Our data include not only individuals’ wage and career histories but also a certain number 
of characteristics of each worker and of the firm where s/he currently works and has held 
previous jobs. We can therefore investigate both the general trends in the overall sample and 
how different subgroups – homogeneous with respect to selected characteristics – were 
affected by the main structural and cyclical factors that occurred in the Italian economy 
during the time period considered. Among personal characteristics, we have information 
about the employee’s gender, age, geographical region where s/he was employed, along with 
his/her job qualification. We can also link these individual-level characteristics to information 
about the firm where the job is held, in particular the firm’s sector of activity and its size.  
The income variable used in this paper will mainly be real monthly earnings at 1996 prices, 
the latest available year. As we do not observe the actual number of hours worked by an 
employee, we cannot compute hourly wages. We do however know the number of days 
worked by each employee in each job spells and his/her total remuneration, which allows us 
to compute the employee’s monthly wage after a suitable normalization.
4 Arguably, this is the 
distribution of interest if one is investigating the monetary incentives that the labor market 
offers to different sectors of the population and in different activity sectors. However, in Box 
4 of the paper and for reasons that will be made clear, we will also pay attention to the 
distribution of annual earnings, i.e. the income measure that results from consideration of 
both the daily wage and of the number of days actually worked during the year. Further 
explanations about the way our earnings variable has been derived are provided in Box 1.  
A final remark concerns our focus on the distribution of positive earnings, which should 
not be confused with the distribution of ‘potential’ earnings – i.e. the distribution that includes 
the earnings that zero earners would have received if they had worked. Nor are we allowed, 
                                                 
2 See Aghion and Williamson (1998). 
3 See chapter XX of a description of the INPS data. 
4 We will tend to speak of ‘wages’ and ‘earnings’ as synonymous, referring in each case to the flow of monetary 
compensation that the employee receives in a month for his/her work, gross of income tax and of the social 
security contributions paid by the worker.   4 
by the very nature of our data, to make inference on the wage distributions in sectors of 
activity not covered by the INPS, as explained in chapter xx. It is with these qualifications in 




BOX 1   Earnings derivation 
 
The gross monthly wage, W, is the ratio between gross annual earnings of the employee, 
YW, and the total number of days s/he worked and got paid for, PD, during the year. The 





W =            ( 1 )  
 
A monthly wage calculated as in (1) is assigned to each employee for each year s/he is 
observed in the panel. W implicitly refers to the worker’s ‘typical’ monthly earnings – had 
s/he worked full-time and full-year - and can be compared across employees, independently 
of the number of days they actually worked in a year. Finally W has been deflated by the 
consumer prices index for white and blue collar worker households (source: ISTAT), so as to 
obtain a variable in real terms, measured at 1996 prices. 
 
In practice, though, not everybody in our sample works full-time and full-year, which 
entails two complications. First, for those who work only a fraction of the year, our monthly 
wage may not fully reflect the worker’s economic situation, which might be better 
summarized by his/her annual earnings. If there are many employees who are not recorded as 
working full-year in the INPS data, the distribution of monthly earnings and annual earnings 
may well look different. We will come back to this issue in Box 4. 
 
An additional problem is brought about by the presence of individuals that work part-time. 
In this case, an adjustment is necessary to PD if the part-timers’ wage is to be fully 
comparable with the full-timers’. In the INPS data the exact number of hours worked in a day 
is not recorded. However, from the week-level information available in the data, we can 
recover a coefficient – call it q – that multiplies the number of days worked in part-time jobs 
and converts them in terms of full-time equivalent. Specifically, q is defined as the ratio 
between the number of hours worked during a week in a part-time job and the number of 
hours scheduled in the collective national contract for the same full-time job, for example 40 
hours per week. The coefficient q is equal to one - by definition - if the employee’s j-th job is 
full-time; otherwise q is less than one. The total number of days worked by an individual in 
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where j = 1,…, J  refers to the J job spells that the employee has had in the year. 
 
 
   5 
We start our analysis by focusing on the population as a whole, while in section 3 we will 
move on to our decomposition exercise, breaking down the population in various subgroups. 
Various papers have performed similar exercises for other countries and represent therefore 
natural starting points for our research in a cross-national perspective. In particular, the 
framework of analysis used by Jenkins (1996) in his study of the UK income distribution 
trends has inspired the present work.  
By way of first acquaintance with our data, let us consider three reference years only, 
1985, 1991 and 1996, i.e. the start, an intermediate and the final year in our sample. Figure 1 
illustrates graphical representations of the density functions of the earnings distributions in 
those three years, calculated with the Kernel estimation method
5. The heights of the curve 
show the concentration of people at different points along the wage scale, and the area under 
the curve between two wage levels shows the proportion of the population with wages 
between those two levels (the area under the whole curve is equal to 100 per cent). To 
describe an income distribution analysts often focus on its location, spread and modality, 
which are respectively related to real income levels, income inequality and income clumping. 
A universal increment to wages – due for example to a generalized economic growth – would 
result in a shift of the curve along to the right. An increase in inequality could be generated in 
several ways, including, for example, a “squashing down” of the curve, flattening it and 
stretching it away from the average wage in both directions. Changes in wage clumping are 
revealed by changes in the “bumps” of income concentration at different points along the 
wage scale. Various statistical and graphical devices will be used below to describe how these 

























Note: the horizontal axis measures monthly wages. The wage frequency density function (vertical axis) 
shows the concentration of people at each wage level. Wages greater than 6.7 million of Italian liras
6 are 
not shown (but have been used to compute the kernel density) so as to improve the picture’s readability.  
Source: INPS panel data 1985, 1991, 1996. 
 
                                                 
5 For a non-technical explanation of the kernel density estimation methods used in this paper, and their 
advantages over more commonly used methods such as histograms, see Cowell et al. (1994). 
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Figure 1 puts in evidence some important aspects of the earnings distribution in Italy in the 
reference years. Firstly, at both ends of each density function, the curve is relatively low: 
there are relatively few people with the very low wages, and also relatively few with the very 
high wages. The vast majority of the population have monthly wages between about two 
millions and four millions of Italian liras, and the greatest concentration – the mode – is at 
about L2,4 million p.m. Secondly, all three curves are strongly asymmetrical towards the right 
hand side, so that the proportion of employees earning more than the modal wage is larger 
than the proportion earning less. The “fat” and long tail on the right also points to the 
existence of a relatively small number of very well paid individuals, a fact that is confirmed 
below by a mean wage exceeding the median. Note how the right tail has become even thicker 
towards the end of the period, a circumstance that hints to an increase in overall wage 
dispersion/inequality. Thirdly, though the density curb appears to be relatively smooth and 
unimodal, some wage clumping can be observed – particularly so in 1985 – in the left tail. In 
subsequent years, this “bump” of wage concentration gets flatter but does not disappear 
completely. Finally, observe how the 1991 density function resembles a shift to the right of 
the 1985 density, while the 1996 density appears to be located in between. As we show 
below, this pattern is consistent with the business cycle that the Italian economy went through 
during the period. 
 
The patterns revealed by figure 1 deserve a more-in-depth investigation, which we 
undertake below by showing the year-to-year changes in various statistical indicators for the 




Wage Distribution Indicators 
 
           
 Mean  Std  p10  p50  p90  p90/p10  p90/p50  p50/p10 
1985  2674 988  1635 2519 3790  2.32  1.50  1.54 
1986  2759 1046 1710 2574 3948  2.31  1.53  1.50 
1987  2831 1134 1749 2612 4124  2.36  1.58  1.49 
1988  2852 1174 1759 2607 4212  2.39  1.62  1.48 
1989  2918 1222 1871 2621 4328  2.31  1.65  1.40 
1990  2962 1265 1880 2645 4441  2.36  1.68  1.41 
1991  3065 1341 1918 2742 4579  2.39  1.67  1.43 
1992  3078 1359 1930 2733 4633  2.40  1.70  1.42 
1993  3075 1337 1948 2735 4596  2.36  1.68  1.40 
1994  3054 1329 1934 2710 4578  2.37  1.69  1.40 
1995  2988 1312 1884 2633 4550  2.41  1.73  1.40 
1996  2977 1314 1888 2612 4544  2.41  1.74  1.38 
% change 
1985-96 
11.3  33  15.4  3.7  19.9  3.9  15.6      -10.4 
Note: values in the first part of the table are expressed in thousands of Italian lire. Source: our 
elaborations on INPS panel data. 
 
In Table 1 we report the temporal sequences of the mean, standard deviation, median (also 
referred to as p50), and the tenth and ninetieth percentiles
7 of the wage distribution – denoted 
                                                 
7  Percentiles divide the earnings distribution - with wages ordered form the lowest to the highest - in groups of 
equal numerousness. For each of these groups, the value of the corresponding percentile is the highest income   7 
by p10 and p90, respectively. Ratios of these percentile points are also commonly used, as 
they help gauging how wages changed in different parts of the distribution.  
The temporal path of mean real earnings reported in column 2 is consistent with the growth 
the Italian economy experienced until 1992, when it reaches its maximum value, and its 
substantial slowdown thereafter. The mean’s decline is such that it reaches in 1996 almost the 
same value it had in 1990. Despite that, over the twelve years in our data average earnings 
grew by about 11%. 
A similar path can be observed for median earnings – which is always lower than mean 
income – and for the bottom and top percentiles. Note, though, that p90 and p50 started to 
decline at least one year earlier than p10, this latter reaching its maximum in 1993. The 
economic slowdown seems, then, to have hurt medium/high earnings prompter than earnings 
at the bottom of the distribution. Notwithstanding this, the earnings of the richest 10% have 
grown by a stunning 20% over the 1985-1996 period, compared with a more modest 15% of 
the poorest 10% of the population. Workers in the median position saw, on the other hand, an 
earnings growth of 4% only.  
These trends can be visualized with the help of Figure 2, which plots mean earnings, p50, 
p10 and p90 over time. Both the poorest and the richest tenth exhibit a growing path in the 
first part of the period, although after 1992 they become flatter and downward sloping. The 
richest tenth had a steeper growth than the bottom tenth, which in turn grew slightly faster 
than the median. For instance, in the 1985 distribution, the monthly wage of the person at the 
richest tenth of the population was 2.3 times the wage of the person at the poorest tenth; by 
1996, the ratio had enlarged at 2.4 (a 4% rise). Even more increased the distance between the 
richest tenth and the median, as their ratio was 1.5 in 1985 and 1.7 in 1996 (a 15% rise). On 
the other hand, the poorest tenth gained ground with respect to the median, with a ratio that 
exhibited a 10% drop from 1985 to 1996. Overall, the evidence presented points to a 
reduction in inequalities in the poorest half of the distribution, to be set against an increase in 
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Source: INPS panel data. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
within the group. For example, deciles split the distribution in ten equal parts, so that p10 is the largest wage in 
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There would seem to be enough empirical evidence to conclude that earnings differences 
in the Italian distribution have been enlarging over the 1980s and 1990s
9, though the increase 
may appear a modest one when compared to the changes experienced by other developed 
countries, the US in particular.
10  
However, this is only partly confirmed by a look at the behavior of the earnings shares of 
deciles groups of the population. Table 2 depicts in more detail the changing fortunes in 
different parts of the distribution and shows, a bit surprisingly, a substantial static pattern for 
the earnings shares in different deciles. Small drops in the earnings share of deciles 2-8 are to 
be set against the more substantial gains recorded by the bottom and top deciles. With the 
evocative image of a big cake representing the total earnings to be distributed in a given year, 
we can say that the poorest tenth of the population has, over time, got a bigger slice. The same 
is true for the richest tenth of the Italian employees, while those situated in more central parts 
of the distribution have received slice smaller and smaller. These findings suggest that a 
limited amount of polarization towards the extremes of the Italian earnings distribution might 
have taken place over the time period studied, with the best well-paid jobs – but also the least 
well-paid ones – improving their situation at the expenses of those in the median position. 
OECD (1996) reports that real wages of low paid workers (first decile) have risen for most 
countries during the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s (the United States 
and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand and Australia are exceptions). However only in a small 
group of OECD countries (Germany, Finland and Canada) among the 13 studied is the growth 
of p10 higher than that of the median and p90. Interestingly, the results therein shown for 
Italy (deriving from the Bank of Italy survey and referring to the period 1983-93) are at 
variance with ours own as p10 is shown to grow by less than both p50 and p90 (OECD, 1996, 
Chart 3.3). 
 
                                                 
8 Needless to say, the study of earnings inequality is only one of the ingredients for the broader – and, to some, 
more appealing – objective of assessing economic inequality. The latter is however beyond the aims of the 
present work. 
9 The same conclusion is reached by Brandolini and Sestito (2000), using the Bank of Italy’s Survey of 
Household income and Wealth. Comparing their percentile ratios for the years 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1992, 
1993 and 1995 with our figures in Table 1, one notes that our p90/p50 is systematically higher while our p50/p10 
is always lower, pointing to a greater polarization of the INPS earnings distribution than in the Bank of Italy’s. 
The differences in the nature of the two date sets (administrative data rather than survey data), as well as the 
income variable used (gross monthly earnings rather than net monthly earnings) are likely to be responsible for 
the observed differences.  
10 The p90/p50 and p50/p10 ratios for the US in 1995 were both equal to 2.1, compared to the value of 1.7 and 
1.4 we obtain for Italy for the same year. During the period 1985-95 in the US, p90/p50 changed by about 17% 
and p50/p10 had a positive growth of about 7-8% (our calculations from Table 3.1 in OECD, 1996).     9 
Table 2 
Earnings shares for Decile Earnings groups: 1985-1996 
 
  Decile earnings groups 
  (poorest)           (richest) 
year  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
              
85  0.049  0.069 0.079 0.085 0.091 0.098 0.105 0.115 0.130  0.180 
86  0.049  0.069 0.078 0.084 0.090 0.097 0.105 0.115 0.131  0.183 
87  0.049  0.069 0.076 0.083 0.089 0.096 0.104 0.114 0.131  0.190 
88  0.049  0.068 0.075 0.081 0.088 0.095 0.104 0.114 0.133  0.193 
89  0.053  0.068 0.074 0.080 0.086 0.094 0.102 0.114 0.133  0.196 
90  0.053  0.067 0.073 0.079 0.086 0.093 0.102 0.114 0.134  0.198 
91  0.052  0.067 0.073 0.079 0.086 0.093 0.102 0.114 0.134  0.200 
92  0.053  0.067 0.073 0.079 0.085 0.093 0.101 0.113 0.134  0.202 
93  0.054  0.067 0.074 0.079 0.086 0.093 0.101 0.113 0.133  0.201 
94  0.054  0.067 0.074 0.079 0.085 0.093 0.101 0.113 0.134  0.201 
95  0.054  0.067 0.073 0.079 0.085 0.092 0.101 0.113 0.135  0.203 
96  0.054  0.067 0.073 0.079 0.084 0.092 0.100 0.113 0.136  0.203 
% change 
1985-96 
10.2  -2.9 -7.5 -7.0 -7.6 -6.1 -4.7 -1.7 4.6  12.7 
 
 
At the same time, the improvement of the economic situation of the least advantaged 
prevents us to predicate that inequality has unambiguously increased in the Italian earnings 
distribution. Economic inequality is often quantitatively assessed by resorting to summary 
measures that aggregate information on the individuals’ incomes and come up with a number 
comprised between a minimum (often zero) - representing a perfectly equal distribution of 
earnings among workers - and a maximum (generally 1) - for the case in which one individual 
in the whole population holds alone total income. It is clear, then, that alternative summary 
measures use a different way of aggregating that information, putting different weights on 
different parts of the distribution. When comparing a set of income distributions, then, 
different indices may rank them differently. In the case of the Italian earnings distribution, 
then, it might well be possible that any measure that puts enough weight to the improved 
economic situation of the bottom tenth ends up declaring that earnings inequality, has indeed 
lowered over the time period 1985-1996. However, for less extremist views on the ways 
inequality is to be measured, the above analysis points to a modest, but not negligible, 
worsening of earnings inequality. This is pictured in Figure 3 that shows the increasing path 
of the most commonly used inequality indices (see box 2 for their formulae).  
The inequality indices considered differ in their sensitivity to income differences in 
different parts of the distribution. For instance, the Theil index is more sensitive than Mean 
Logarithm deviation (MLD) to income differences at the top of the distribution; the Variance 
of Logarithms attaches more importance to income transfers at the lower end of the 
distribution, whilst the Gini coefficient is most sensitive to income differences about the 
middle (more precisely, the mode). Table 3 reports the temporal values of three indices along 
with their bootstrap standard errors, which provide some indication of the variability of those 
estimated inequality values. The impression that earnings inequality has been increasing over 
the period considered is confirmed by each of the three measures computed. The rise slows 
down after 1991, but the level in 1996 is still about 12% higher than in 1985 according to the 
Gini coefficient and almost 32% higher if the variance of logs is used instead. Interestingly,   10 
standard errors appear to be rather small and that increases our confidence in the statistical 
validity of our conclusions about the inequality trends discussed.
11    
 
 
Table 3: Trends in earnings inequality, 1985-1996 
 
Year  Inequality measure 
  Gini Theil  Var-logs 
1985  189 62 122 
  (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0008) 
1986  192 64 123 
  (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0007) 
1987  200 70 130 
  (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) 
1988  206 74 135 
  (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) 
1989  206 75 129 
  (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) 
1990  210 77 134 
  (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0008) 
1991  213 80 138 
  (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0008) 
1992  213 81 136 
  (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0008) 
1993  209 79 131 
  (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) 
1994  210 79 132 
  (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) 
1995  213 81 136 
  (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) 
1996  214 81 137 
  (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0008) 
% change  
1985-96 
12.7 30.45  11.48 
Notes: The values of the indices have been multiplied 





                                                 
11 In principle, one may use these standard errors to statistically test the hypothesis that inequality in one year is 
statistically different than inequality in another. There are however some theoretical and practical complications 
in doing so, due the panel nature of our data (see for instance Biewen, 2001).   11 

















Notes: see Box 2 for the formulae. 
 
 
Box 2  Empirical measures of inequality  
 
The indexes reported in the paragraph are widely used in the literature on inequality 
measurement (for instance, Cowell, 1995). In this appendix we just present their formulae. 
Consider a population of persons, i = 1,...,n, with income yi. Denote the arithmetic mean with 
m.  















Higher values imply higher inequality.  
 
The Gini’s coefficient can be interpreted as the expected income gap (in percentage terms) 














where incomes yi are ordered in ascending order. The index varies between 0 (maximum 
equality) and 1 (maximum inequality).  
 
The Atkinson index can be thought as an index constructed on the basis of a social welfare 
function such that ε  represents the degree of (social) aversion to inequality: 
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A(2)   12 
The index varies between 0 (maximum equality) and 1 (maximum inequality). 
 


















































































,       0 = a  . 
 
 
The inequality indices differ in their sensitivities to income differences in different parts of 
the distribution. The more positive a is, the more sensitive GE(a) is to income differences at 
the top of the distribution; the more negative a is, the more sensitive it is to differences at the 
bottom of the distribution. GE(0) is the mean logarithmic deviation (MLD), GE(1) is the Theil 
index, and GE(2) is half the square of the coefficient of variation. The more positive ε >0 (the 
'inequality aversion parameter') is, the more sensitive A(ε ) is to income differences at the 





It is not easy to explain why earnings inequality has increased, as a variety of changes in 
the economy, such as changes in the industrial structure, increased foreign trade, increased 
immigration, skill-based technical change and the decline in institutions that limit the market 
(e.g., fall in the minimum wage and the decline in unionization) are consistent with the 
observation that wage differentials have enlarged. The interaction of these factors and others 
more specific to the Italian macroeconomic and institutional context adds further elements of 
complexity to the business of disentangling the causes of the widening earnings distribution. 
In Italy some studies have highlighted the role played by the abolition of automatic cost-of-
living indexation (scala mobile) and the ending of synchronized wage bargaining across 
different sectors (Erickson and Ichino, 1995; Bank of Italy, 1995). While these factors are 
likely to have had a widening impact on the earnings distribution, the “stability pact” signed 
between unions and the government in 1992 might be invoked as a potential effect in the 
opposite direction.  
In principle, the impact of business cycle on inequality is unclear, crucially depending on 
the pattern of growth in different subgroups of the distribution. If earnings everywhere 
increase by the same proportion, relative inequality measures (like the ones we have used) do 
not change. On the other hand, overall growth is inequality enhancing when it implies 
disproportional gains (losses) for those at the top (bottom) of the earnings scale. A 
compression of the wage differentials may for example occur if, on the face of an economic 
downturn, labor market institutions concentrate their efforts in the employment and wage 
protection of those at the bottom of the distribution. Lower inequality may also be the   13 
outcome of an economic slowdown where most lay-offs are concentrated amongst low-paid 
low-skill jobs (for example, very young workers), so that the distribution gets ‘censored from 
below’. However, OECD (1996) reports that “no uniform picture emerges either across 
countries or over time of a cyclical pattern in the dispersion of wages”, (p.63).
12 In the case of 
Italy, we find only weak evidence that inequality is higher when average income grows and 
tends to lower during the recession years.
13 
Section 3 further moves in the direction of explaining the observed trends in earnings 




3. What accounts for changes in the earnings distribution. 
 
 
Breakdowns by population subgroups are a useful tool often employed by researchers to 
help disentangle between (some of) the many influences that may be at play in explaining the 
observed changes in the Italian earnings distribution. Underlying these decompositions is the 
basic intuition that some causal factors affect the earnings distribution by changing, in various 
combinations, three basic ingredients: the number of persons in each subgroups, the mean 
earnings in these subgroups, and finally the dispersion within each subgroup. The 
methodology is explained in Box 3. Table 8 contains the results of this decomposition 
exercise and, in its footnotes, presents an illustrative example too.     
An inequality index is decomposable by population subgroups when it satisfies the 
requirement that total inequality be expressed only as a function of the subgroup inequalities, 
mean incomes and population shares. Three of the indices considered so far are exactly 
decomposable, in that total inequality is the sum of a within-group component (an average of 
the subgroup inequalities, weighted by the subgroup share), plus a between-group component 
(the amount of inequality that would remain if there was no inequality within any sub-group). 
The three indices are MLD, the Theil index and GE(2), which are all special cases of the so-




Box 3  Decomposition methodology used in Table 8  
 
Suppose there is an exhaustive partition of the population into mutually-exclusive 
subgroups k = 1,...,K.  
Inequality indices in the generalised entropy family are the ones with the most desirable 
decomposability properties (see for example, Cowell, 1995). Each GE(a) index can be 
additively decomposed as  
 
GE(a) = GEW (a) + GEB (a) 
 
where GEW (a) is Within-group inequality and GEB (a) is Between-Group inequality. 
 
 
                                                 
12 However, Burtless (1990) found that inequality in annual earnings of all workers in the United States tended to 
rise during a recession. 
13 A 12-observation regression of each of the inequality indices shown in Table 3 on a deterministic time trend, 
average earnings and its growth rate displayed positive but not statistically significant coefficients.      14 
It can be shown that: 
 













where vk= Nk/N is the number of persons in subgroup k divided by the total number of 
persons (subgroup population share), and sk is the share of total income held by k's members 
(subgroup income share). GEk(a), inequality for subgroup k, is calculated as if the subgroup 
were a separate population, and GEB(a) is derived assuming every person within a given 




3.1 Earnings trends by activity sectors 
 
 
A first exercise we consider is to separately investigate earnings trends for workers 
belonging to the three activity sectors - constructions, manufacturing and services – in which 
the totality of jobs has been partitioned. In principle, modifications occurred to the Italian 
industrial structure in the 1980s and 1990s may well be responsible for an important part of 
the economic growth performance and the distributional changes discussed so far. Table 4 
displays the time series of mean earnings and three percentiles for jobs held in each of the 
three sectors.  
One can soon notice a confirmation to the general pattern found for the whole distribution: 
mean earnings grew in constructions and services until 1992 (1993 for manufacturing) and 
then they decreased. When we look at the p10, p50 and p90 earnings percentiles, the story is 
not very different: the path is a growing one during the first eight/nine years, becoming more 
stable or even decreasing during the last three/four years. Note that, while p10 starts declining 
only after 1993, there is a tendency of p90 to get dragged down more promptly by the 
economic slowdown. In constructions and services, in effect, p90 starts declining in 1992. 
More revealing is a direct comparison of the three sectors performance between the first 
and the last year in our sample. Overall growth was very low for construction (a 0.3% change 
during the period) and much higher in manufacturing (7.1%) and services (10.3%). In 1985, 
mean earnings were highest in constructions, followed by services and manufacturing. In the 
following years services emerge as the sector that pays better on average, 6% more than 
manufacturing and 10% more than constructions in 1996. Interestingly, however, construction 
is the sector that guarantees better pay for employees at the bottom (p10) and at the median of 
the distribution
14, followed by manufacturing. This ranking is completely reversed when we 
look at p90, which explains why the mean in service is higher than in the two other sectors.  
                                                 
14 These results consider only regular jobs, while in the construction sector irregular jobs are easily diffused and, 
usually, they are low-paid jobs.   15 
Table 4 
Manufacturing, Constructions and Services 
 
    Mean     p10    p50    p90  
  Manuf. Constr. Service Manuf. Constr. Service Manuf. Constr. Service Manuf. Constr. Service 
1985  2653 2722 2694 1699 1776 1523 2499 2752 2439 3708 3465 4103 
1986  2730 2770 2808 1762 1863 1614 2547 2760 2530 3869 3518 4207 
1987  2787 2785 2926 1773 1903 1682 2586 2772 2571 3984 3512 4538 
1988  2797 2822 2956 1759 1894 1723 2573 2801 2577 4067 3608 4591 
1989  2871 2839 3023 1862 1975 1866 2591 2759 2602 4224 3647 4656 
1990  2898 2909 3086 1872 1961 1871 2604 2832 2627 4298 3788 4847 
1991  3013 2988 3174 1908 1971 1920 2697 2901 2737 4520 3928 4871 
1992  3022 2991 3194 1919 1983 1933 2693 2913 2713 4515 3881 5026 
1993  3030 2943 3179 1938 1999 1960 2706 2845 2735 4498 3784 4920 
1994  3013 2923 3150 1916 1991 1952 2685 2829 2705 4506 3774 4876 
1995  2928 2810 3120 1864 1915 1920 2607 2687 2650 4390 3682 4977 
1996  2925 2778 3098 1874 1923 1906 2594 2641 2628 4407 3650 4902 
% change 
1985-96 
7.1 0.3  10.3  6.4 3.2  18.1  1.8 -4.3 3.9  13.9  3.8  16.5 
Note: Values are expressed in thousands of Italian liras. Source: INPS panel data. 
 
 
The trends described above are better visualized with the help of figure 4, which focus on the 


























Percentiles historical series suggest that earnings inequality in services is larger than in 
manufacturing. However, focusing only on few points of the distribution can be misleading 
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occurred within and between the three activity sectors we first display the estimates of the 
density functions and next turn to the decomposition of total inequality in its within-group and 
between-group components. The ingredients of such an exercise are collected in Table 8. In 
the interest of brevity, both the density functions and the figures reported in Table 8 refer to a 
direct comparison only of the first and the last years in our sample. Given that observed trends 
during the whole period manifest a generally increasing path, this choice does not seem to 
significantly distort the overall picture.  
 
Figure 5 
Frequency Density Function:  



















Source: INPS panel data, 1985 and 1996. 
 
 
The estimates of the density functions in 1985 and 1996 for these three sectors are 
revealing of important changes occurred in the Italian industrial structure during the 1980s 
and 1990s (see Figure 5). Mean earnings increased in all three sectors, but perhaps more 
striking is the augmented thickness of the right tails of the three densities portrayed by figure 
5. Workers in the service distribution continue to display a right tail that is thicker than in the 
other sectors in both years. Note also how the density function of manufacturing features a 
“bump” in its left tail in 1985 - which is somewhat reduced in 1996 – while services and 
constructions present more regular curves. Overall the distributional changes occurred within 
and between sector are such that their density functions look much more the same in 1996 
than they were in 1985.  
The horizontal Panel F of Table 8 offers additional ingredients for a better understanding 
of the modifications that concerned the Italian industrial structure. As shown by column 5, 
manufacturing’s share was 57% in 1985 but declined to 52% in 1996. Constructions too 
shrunk, from a share of 13% in 1985 to a tinier 10% at the end of the period. On the other 
hand, workers employed in the service sector witnessed a sizeable expansion from a share of 
30% to 38% in 1996. The relative decline of manufacturing and constructions is also 
substantiated by the changes in average earnings. Manufacturing had the lowest relative mean 
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visible is the reduction of relative mean earnings experienced by the construction sector: 
mean monthly earnings increased from 2.722 million Italian liras in 1985 to 2.778 in 1996, 
but - relative to the population mean – this is equivalent to a mean earnings drop from 1.02 to 
0.93.  The relative mean of the service sector, instead, increased from 1.01 to 1.04. 
 
When we turn to earnings inequality other interesting results emerge. According to the 
three measures reported in columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 8, services is the sector with highest 
inequality levels in both 1985 and 1996, followed by manufacturing and constructions. 
However, in terms of inequality growth, earnings differentials opened faster in manufacturing, 
followed by constructions and services. 
Interestingly, virtually all observed inequality is accounted for by the within-group 
component. Though of a negligible entity, note how the between-group component has 
slightly increased in 1996.  
 
 
3.2 Earnings trends by gender 
 
We now disaggregate the sample according to gender. It is well known that the 
participation of women to the Italian labor market has been increasing over time, and in fact 
female employees had a share of 30% in 1985 and of 33% in 1996 (see Table 8, column 5, 























Note: we showed two representative years in order to have extremes of the sample. 
Source: INPS panel data, 1985 and 1996. 
 
The distribution for women appears to be characterized by smaller modal earnings than for 
men (Figure 6). It is also evident how the female’s distribution is much more concentrated 
around its mode than the men’s. Moreover, the men’s distribution presents a ticker right tail 
that is considerably flatter than women’s, providing hints that earnings are more dispersed for 
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Also worrying is the larger proportion of women that receive pays at the bottom of the 
earnings scale compared to men, as implied by the “fatter” tail that the female distribution 
displays on the left. In effect, there is a “bump” in the left tail of the distributions in 1985, 
which seems to be more accentuated for women. In 1996 the female distribution moved to the 
right, somewhat getting closer to the shape of men’s. Yet, notable differences persist both in 
the extent of concentration around the mode and in the amount of right-tail skewness. 
A more detailed numerical assessment of these differences can be drawn from the figures 
collected in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 
Men and Women 
 
(a) percentile levels 
 
  Mean  p10  p50  p90  Male / Female 
  Male  Female Male Female Male Female Male Female mean  p10  p50  P90 
1985  2839  2289 1841 1387 2682 2222 4010 3129 1.24  1.33  1.21  1.28 
1986  2929  2346 1898 1457 2741 2252 4177 3253 1.25  1.30  1.22  1.28 
1987  3002  2426 1922 1505 2776 2282 4364 3402 1.24  1.28  1.22  1.28 
1988  3030  2434 1905 1539 2789 2268 4462 3448 1.24  1.24  1.23  1.29 
1989  3095  2515 1967 1740 2799 2294 4598 3553 1.23  1.13  1.22  1.29 
1990  3146  2545 1970 1744 2831 2306 4729 3648 1.24  1.13  1.23  1.30 
1991  3251  2650 2008 1799 2918 2412 4876 3781 1.23  1.12  1.21  1.29 
1992  3263  2668 2012 1835 2912 2411 4939 3826 1.22  1.10  1.21  1.29 
1993  3251  2687 2037 1844 2901 2429 4885 3844 1.21  1.10  1.19  1.27 
1994  3234  2670 2020 1832 2880 2410 4877 3841 1.21  1.10  1.19  1.27 
1995  3162  2627 1953 1798 2795 2359 4845 3813 1.20  1.09  1.18  1.27 
1996  3151  2623 1958 1804 2772 2349 4836 3832 1.20  1.09  1.18  1.26 
% change 
1985-96 
11.0  14.6 6.3 30.1 3.4  5.7 20.6  22.5 -3.1  -18.2  -2.2 -1.5 
 
 
(b) percentile ratios 
 
  p90/p50 p50/p10 p90/p10 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female 
1985  1.50 1.41 1.46 1.60 2.18 2.26 
1986  1.52 1.44 1.44 1.55 2.20 2.23 
1987  1.57 1.49 1.44 1.52 2.27 2.26 
1988  1.60 1.52 1.46 1.47 2.34 2.24 
1989  1.64 1.55 1.42 1.32 2.34 2.04 
1990  1.67 1.58 1.44 1.32 2.40 2.09 
1991  1.67 1.57 1.45 1.34 2.43 2.10 
1992  1.70 1.59 1.45 1.31 2.45 2.09 
1993  1.68 1.58 1.42 1.32 2.40 2.08 
1994  1.69 1.59 1.43 1.32 2.41 2.10 
1995  1.73 1.62 1.43 1.31 2.48 2.12 
1996  1.74 1.63 1.42 1.30 2.47 2.12 
% change 
1985-96 
16.7 15.8 -2.8 -18.7  13.4 -5.8 
Source: INPS panel data. 
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As one may expect, mean earnings for men are higher than for women in each year of our 
sample. In 1996 this difference was still about 20%. Looking at trends, the general increasing 
patterns found for the population as a whole are confirmed for both men and women. For men 
(women) the distribution mean grew until 1992 (1993), but the subsequent reduction was 
much more moderate for women than for men. The turning point in the levels of p10 is 1993 
for both sexes, and for p50 and p90 for women. For men, instead, the decline of p90 and p50 
started at least one year earlier. This circumstance may suggest that the economic slowdown 
was slightly more deleterious for medium/high earnings of men, or at least that it hurt them 
more promptly, then for women or low-paid men.  
A glance at the growth rates reported in the last row of table 5(a) demonstrates that female 
employees have been catching up with men over the time period studied, a finding common to 
all OECD countries (OECD, 1996). Female’s average earnings grew by almost 15% from 
1985 to 1996, while men’s growth was only 11%. At all percentile points, too, female 
employees saw their earnings expand more than men. Particularly impressive was the pay 
raise of the poorest female tenth, which increased by 30% compared to a much smaller 6% for 
men. In Italy as in other OECD countries, the gender gap is narrowed not only because of the 
substantial earnings rise of more qualified women, but also – and above all – because 
women’s growth at the bottom of the distribution has been larger than for men. Note also that 
for both men and women the median was characterized by a much more stable path, which – 
coupled with the large expansion of the distribution extremes – is consistent with increased 
polarization.  
Finally, Table 5(b) computes the percentile ratios for men and women separately and 
provides clues that earnings are more unequally distributed for men than for women – a result 
consistently found in the literature. In effect, the ratio of p90 and p50 is always higher for 
men, as is the ratio of p90 and p10 – with the exclusion of the two initial years. The men’s 
ratio of p50 and p10 is instead lower than for women until 1988, after which year the situation 
is reversed as a reflection of the spectacular growth of women’s p10. This would imply that 
not only inequality amongst men is greater; it is also rising faster than among women.  
 
The decomposition of observed inequality into within-gender and between-gender 
components (Table 8, panel B) enables us to deliver a numerical assessment of the previous 
indications. For the three summary measures considered, inequality is higher for men than for 
women at the start and at the end of the sample period, and is also increasing faster. Once 
again, the lion’s share of observed inequality is held by the within-group components, but 
inequality between men and women explains between four and eight percent of total 
inequality. Moreover, the within-group component has been expanding over time, 
highlighting an increasing return to observable and unobservable characteristics other than 
gender. On the other hand, differences between men and women as separate groups have been 
somewhat reduced by the economic changes that took place in the twelve years following 
1985, as demonstrated by a falling between-group contribution.  
 
 
3.3 Earnings trends by age groups 
 
Next, we disaggregate our sample into four different age groups. The first comprises the 
youngest employees – presumably new entrants – with age between 15 and 24. The second 
group is made up by more experienced young employees with age between 25 and 34, while 
the third group consists of all those with age between 35 and 49. The most mature workers – 
with age between 50 and 64 – constitute the final group. As reported in Table 8 (panel E, 
column 5), the youngest employees had a share of about 26 per cent in 1985, which dropped   20 
at only 17% in 1996. The oldest age group shrunk too, though to a much lesser extent (from 
14% in 1985 to 13% in 1996). On the other hand, those with age 25-34 considerably 
expanded their share, from 28 to 35 per cent, as did those with age 35-49, from 32 to 35 per 
cent. This modification of the age structure in our sample – which points to a significant 
ageing of the employee population – is likely to be at the root of important distributional 
changes.      
Figure 7 draws the distribution density functions for the four age groups, separately. Not 
unexpectedly, the older the employee group the more located and skewed to the right is the 
corresponding density function. The empirical and theoretical literature on earnings has long 
documented wage profiles that are increasing (at a decreasing rate) with age and that, at the 
same time, features increasing variability as the cohort grows older. Young employees are 
less experienced and more likely to have entered the labor market in a job that does not fully 
rewards their unobservable skills. As time passes, they acquire knowledge and employers 
manage to elicit more information on the employee’s skills. As a result received wages grow 
and become more variable across workers observationally equivalent. The two older age 
classes – 35-49 and 50-64 years old – have almost identical distributions, with a right tail 
definitely larger than the other two younger classes – 15-24 and 25-34 years old. Note also 
that the distribution for the youngest age group displays a bump in the left tail of the wage 


























Confronting 1985 with 1996, three main features catch the eye. Reflecting the general 
economic growth during the period, the density functions shifted to the right for each age 
cohort. Also, the heights of the curves lowered in 1996, particularly so for the two older age 
groups, and the right tails became thicker. One would then expect wage dispersion to have 
enlarged in these sub-groups.  
Table 6 focuses on the youngest (15-24) and the oldest (50-64). In principle, the former are 
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Table 6 
Young and Old 
 
  Mean  p10 p50 p90  Y  /  O 
  Y O Y O Y O Y O  mean  p10  p50  p90 
1985  2115 2981 1292 1949 2109 2786 2838 4292 0.71  0.66  0.76  0.66 
1986  2115 3110 1297 2026 2105 2857 2827 4536 0.68  0.64  0.74  0.62 
1987  2136 3228 1309 2082 2121 2915 2846 4801 0.66  0.63  0.73  0.59 
1988  2131 3293 1310 2072 2102 2961 2861 5006 0.65  0.63  0.71  0.57 
1989  2195 3388 1420 2124 2133 2992 2892 5165 0.65  0.67  0.71  0.56 
1990  2215 3479 1468 2133 2139 3057 2954 5339 0.64  0.69  0.70  0.55 
1991  2281 3656 1488 2201 2217 3181 3061 5673 0.62  0.68  0.70  0.54 
1992  2282 3690 1537 2206 2203 3175 3042 5823 0.62  0.70  0.69  0.52 
1993  2277 3616 1555 2180 2207 3124 2992 5693 0.63  0.71  0.71  0.53 
1994  2241 3661 1525 2173 2174 3160 2934 5761 0.61  0.70  0.69  0.51 
1995  2189 3569 1495 2101 2123 3050 2851 5752 0.61  0.71  0.70  0.50 
1996  2169 3613 1472 2104 2107 3079 2828 5784 0.60  0.70  0.68  0.49 
% change 
1985-96 
2.6 21.2  13.9 8.0 -0.1 10.5 -0.4 34.8  -15.4 5.5 -9.6  -26.1 
Note: Y stands for young (age 15-24) and O for old (age 50-64). Values in the first part of the table are 























Note: where Y stays for young – dotted lines -and O old –continuum lines. We kept a constant range of £ 4 
million shifted from 0 to 2 million in the second graph. Source: INPS panel data. 
 
 
Together with Figure 8, Table 6 documents a picture of relative stability of the wage 
distribution of the group of new entrants, at least when this is compared to the distribution of 
the almost-leavers. The result of these trends is that the gap between the very young and the 
oldest workers has visibly magnified over the 1980s and the 1990s. In fact, while the new-
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over the entire time window. Mainly this is the result of the stunning growth experienced by 
those aged 50-64 and receiving very high wages, as shown by an almost 35% raise of p90. 
The same percentile for those aged 15-24 was virtually unchanged in 1996 from its value in 
1985. To a lesser extent a similar discrepancy is also found for the medians of the two groups. 
However, at very low wages the new-entrants score a higher growth than the almost-leavers, 
with p10 increasing respectively of 14% and 8%. Whether this is the effect of institutional 
constraints (e.g., labor market legislation for young employees) or of more general market 
forces is hard to say within our descriptive framework. Further research is called for shedding 
light on this important issue. 
 
Table 8 (panel E) makes the overall picture even clearer by comparing various inequality 
indicators for the first and last year in the sample period. Relatively to the population mean, 
the mean of the youngest cohort decreased from 0.79 to 0.73, while the reduction of the next 
younger group fell from about unity to 0.93. On the contrary, the two most senior groups saw 
their mean wages increase relative to the overall mean, suggesting that structural changes in 
the Italian labor market might have pushed the return to seniority and experience upwards – 
as has been documented in all developed countries. As about earnings inequality, the 
theoretical link between age and increased dispersion seems to be confirmed by the three 
indicators computed. The relation is not monotonic, though, with inequality in age group 25-
34 being lower than in age group 15-24. When we examine trends in inequality within each 
subgroup, we witness to a widening of relative earnings differences in all but the youngest age 
group (due to the improved situation of very low wages in that group). 
Once again the bulk of observed inequality is within-group, and this is increasing too. 
However, differences between age groups are important (being able to account for between 13 




3.4 Earnings trends by region  
 
Next, we disaggregate the sample by geographical areas. We identify three Italian macro-
regions as follows: 
 
North:  Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardia, Trentino, Veneto, Liguria and 
Emilia Romagna.  
Centre:  Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio and Abruzzo.    
South:   Campania, Molise, Basilicata, Puglia, Calabria, Sardegna and Sicilia. 
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Figure 9 

















Source: INPS panel data. 
 
 
With reference to their density functions the three macro-regions do not seem to differ 
much, particularly so in 1996 when it becomes hard to distinguish the three curves (figure 9). 
In 1985 the south stands out for its more pronounced bump in the left-hand tail and its tri-
modality (its highest mode is larger than the modes in the remaining macro-areas). Note also 
that in 1985 the proportion of employees with low monthly earnings was higher in the south, 
followed by the center. However, these features do not seem to persist in 1996 as well.  
These findings may be thought of as at variance with what one would expect in a country 
where, notoriously, a prosperous and economically developed north is often contrasted to a 
more backward south. The possibility that the wage normalization used so far - where the 
employee’s annual remuneration is divided by the number of days s/he is recorded to have 
worked during the year - may hide distortions of the INPS data panel, and particularly so in 
the southern parts of the country, is investigated in Box 4.  
 
 
BOX 4  Measuring the wage differentials between North and South 
 
BOX 4.1 Normalizing and measuring amount of work produced 
 
In every analysis in which a unit measure is needed, the reference variable must undergo a 
process of normalization. The study of wage differentials therefore demands a normalization 
of the gross earnings received by workers, in such a way to consider earnings independently 
of the length of time of each pay period. 
The desiderata would be to have a measure of hourly pay so as to permit an accurate 
evaluation of the economic condition of each employment position. To obtain such an 
indicator one must know the number of hours worked per week, which is also useful in 
verifying that collective work contracts are respected (which set a ceiling for the number of 
hours worked per week for “ordinary” employment). 
But INPS collects information on dependent workers only for purposes strictly related to 
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each employee, on the other side it measures the level of employment seniority of the worker, 
which is the basis on which his future pension is calculated. 
In one case (payments made by employers), the necessary information is in the form of the 
daily wage: the firm applies a tax rate to the daily wage payments, which must be equal to or 
greater than a minimum established by INPS. In the second case (determination of a worker’s 
employment seniority), the relevant information is in the form of the number of paid weeks, 
remembering that working one day in any given week is sufficient to consider it a paid week. 
In light of the fact that one cannot rely on measures of the number of hours worked, the 
most natural next best measure is daily wages. Multiplying daily wage by 26, it can be 
considered the monthly wage. 
 
 
BOX 4.2    Paid days by geographical area 
 
When the distribution of the paid days
15 by geographical area is observed, it appears that in 
the South employees work less, especially industrial workers (table box 4.1)
16. This data 
could influence the proper measuring of the wage gap between the North and South, which as 
shown in figure 9, is almost non-existent. 
 
Table box 4.1 
Distribution of paid days for full-time industrial workers 
 
paid         
days  North West  North Est  Centr
e 
South islands 
0-26 4.7  5.0  5.3  7.9  9.0 
27-78 8.0  10.3  9.0  12.6  17.4 
79-156 8.8  10.5  10.8  12.4  12.3 
157-234 8.0  8.3  9.7  14.8 13.1 
235-286 9.5  8.2  12.6  16.0 14.2 
287+  61.0  57.6 52.6  36.3  34.0 
absolute 
values 
13850 10364 6366  5351  1540 
 
Table box 4.2 
Distribution of paid days for full-time industrial workers that are paid for 12 months by the 
same firm 





Centre South  islands 
0-26  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
27-78 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 
79-156  0.2 0.2 0.7 2.5 1.5 
157-234  1.2 0.8 3.1 12.2  10.0 
235-286  8.5 6.2 13.5  22.6  20.5 
287+  90.1  92.7 82.6 62.4  67.7 
absolute 
values 
9366 6435 4056 3109 772 
 
                                                 
15 One speaks of paid days, some of which may not be worked days, since included under this heading are 
periods of paid time during which no work is done (maternity leave, sick leave, holiday…). 
16 Econometric estimates indicate, however, that in the mezzogiorno – ceteris paribus – the number of paid days 
is much lower than in the central northern area. See Contini, Filippi, Malpede (2001).   25 
Selecting only full-time employment spells that are not interrupted during the year, in 
which the employee is paid by the same firm for the full 12 months, one expects that the 
number of paid days would not be so different between different geographical areas. In 
reality, differences persist (table box 4.2) and could have varying explanations. Two of these 
explanations seem particularly plausible: 
- There could be errors in the codification of the contract, such that a part-time position is 
considered full-time. 
- The firms could have an incentive to declare fewer paid days than there really are, so   
that they fall into the minimum category of daily wages established by INPS. 
For a more complete examination of this topic, see Contini, Filippi, Malpede (2001). Here, 
it is of interest to point out how in some cases it is helpful to make use of the sum total of all 
yearly earnings for purposes of national comparisons. 
 
BOX 4.3   Wage differentials using the sum of all wages gained in a year 
 
Figure 10/a shows the comparison using for the entire sample the yearly wage:  the gap in 
favour of the North is certainly overestimated because there is a higher number of short term 
employment spells in the South, which creates a distortion in the analysis. 
 
Figure 10a 


















Note: Distribution of wages calculated as sum of all wages gained in a year. Source: INPS panel data. 
 
Figure 10/b instead shows a comparison between groups of “similar” workers, relative to 
their pay period (12 months):  with these figures, using the sum of all wages gained in a year, 
an undistorted national comparison can be made. Neither different numbers of paid days nor 
pay periods of differing duration distort the comparison. The difference between North and 
South is reduced, but remains nonetheless higher than that revealed using monthly wages, as 
shown in figure 10/b. 
In conclusion, yearly wages can be important in analysing wage differentials in the 
presence of apparently distorted measures of daily wages, but it is necessary to consider 
homogeneous groups of workers, that is those with the same type of contract (full-time) and 
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Figure 10b 
Frequency Density Function by Regional Area in 1985 and 1996. 




































Note: each line shows the ratio between northern and southern mean respectively with 





3.5 Earnings trends by occupation 
 
Our last subgroup breakdown is by occupation type: manual (blue collar), non-manual 
(white collar), manager and apprentice. Needless to say, this classification is correlated with 
the skills possessed by each worker and required for any particular job.  
The two most important groups are the blue and the white collars, having in 1985 a share 
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and apprentices in the population were a tiny 0.4 and 7 percent, respectively. These shares 
went through important structural changes during our sample period, with both white collars 
and managers absorbing a larger share of the Italian employees at the expenses of the other 
two groups (see Table 8, panel C).  
Figure 11 puts under a lens the wage distributions of blue and white collars, highlighting 
the main differences in the shape of their density functions. Not only have white collars a 
wage distribution that is much less concentrated than blue collars’. Their distribution is also 
substantially more skewed to the right. While this pattern was already visible in 1985, it 
became even more so eleven years later. 
 
Figure 11 


















Note: we showed two representative years in order to have extremes of the sample. Source: INPS panel data. 
 
Trends of mean earnings, p10, p50 and p90 are investigated with the help of Table 7. For 
both blue and white-collar workers, mean earnings decreased after 1991-92, an anticipated 
pattern. The growth rate was higher for white collars, no matter the part of the distribution we 
are looking at – including the mean. Figure 12 helps visualizing the percentile patterns. See in 
particular how white collars’ p90 (p90 W) grew more than blue collars’ (p90 B), which may 
largely be held responsible for the differential means growth observed in the two groups. 
White collars show a quite strange drop after 1995 in the richest decile. If we look at table 3 
in the data box (section W), we note that the number of white collars present in the panel 
strongly declined while the managers’ number highly arose. This is because a considerable 
proportion of white collars after 1995 passed to the manager workers group. 
Blue collars’ average wages were below the overall average in 1985 and they saw a 
worsening of their relative position during the next 11 years, their relative mean dropping 
from 0.95 to 0.88 (see Table 8). White collars kept their relative mean wages above the 
aggregate mean in both years and no appreciable trend can be spotted. Observe, as is obvious, 
how apprentices and managers have mean earnings that are, respectively, substantially lower 
and higher than the aggregate mean. Perhaps more surprising, is the circumstance that both 
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Table 7 
Blue and White Collars 
 
  Mean  p10  p50  p90    B / W   
  B W B W B W B W  mean  p10  p50  p90 
1985  2552 3175 1783 1940 2481 2927 3358 4735 0.80  0.92  0.85  0.71 
1986  2595 3279 1852 2001 2509 3050 3430 4845 0.79  0.93  0.82  0.71 
1987  2631 3430 1892 2057 2538 3132 3485 5190 0.77  0.92  0.81  0.67 
1988  2636 3476 1885 2077 2528 3171 3523 5283 0.76  0.91  0.80  0.67 
1989  2690 3543 1947 2114 2538 3211 3603 5408 0.76  0.92  0.79  0.67 
1990  2712 3609 1947 2112 2555 3257 3659 5585 0.75  0.92  0.78  0.66 
1991  2784 3740 1978 2213 2632 3359 3752 5766 0.74  0.89  0.78  0.65 
1992  2780 3748 1978 2196 2622 3351 3731 5818 0.74  0.90  0.78  0.64 
1993  2752 3743 1972 2235 2603 3358 3673 5747 0.74  0.88  0.78  0.64 
1994  2727 3725 1947 2216 2576 3348 3660 5729 0.73  0.88  0.77  0.64 
1995  2653 3695 1895 2173 2496 3286 3590 5763 0.72  0.87  0.76  0.62 
1996  2635 3546 1895 2148 2474 3183 3571 5341 0.74  0.88  0.78  0.67 
% change 
1985-96 
1.5 8.1 2.3 7.3 -1.4 4.4 4.1  10.2  -6.3  -5.4  -4.9  -5.6 






















Note: B stays for blue collars and W for white collars. We kept a constant range of £ 3.5 million shifted from 
0.3 to 2.3 million in the second graph. Source: INPS panel data. 
 
 
Table 8 numerically assesses the general impression that white collars have the most 
unequal earnings distribution, according to whichever of the three indices is used and in both 
1985 and 1996. Universally confirmed is also the fact that inequality within white-collar 
workers increased during the 1980s and 1990s. The precise ranking of the four groups in 
terms of their levels of inequality does however depend on the particular measures chosen. 
Inequality seems to have lowered for apprentices, according to the three measures, but no 
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The within-group component certainly explains most of the observed inequality but note 
that for this population partition the between-group component is now able to explain as large 
as 36% of observed inequality. Moreover, this component has exhibited an impressive growth 
during the period 1985-1996, more than doubling its level. This implies that skills that we can 
observe and classify as above have increasingly attracted differential rate of returns in the 
labor market.  
 
 30 
Table 8:  Inequality decompositions by population subgroups, 1985 and 1996 
 
  (1)  (2)    (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7) 
                                
  Sub-group 1000*GE(0)  1000*GE(1)   1000*GE(2)    Share (%)    mean    relative mean 
  P a r t i t i o n                               
    1985  1996     1985  1996     1985  1996     1985  1996     1985  1996     1985  1996 
A                                
  All persons  61 74    62 81    68  97    100 100    2674  2977    100  100 
                                
B                                
  Male  58  77    59  84   65  99   70  67   2839 3151    1.06  1.06 
  female  51  58    52  64   57  77   30  33   2289 2623    0.86  0.88 
                                
  within-group  56 71    57 78    64  94                 
  inequality                              
  between-group  5 4    5 4    4  3                   
  inequality                              
                                
C                                
  blue collars  39  38    38  40   40  45   66  61   2552 2635    0.95  0.88 
  White collars  68  70    68  74   73  83   26  32   3176 3553    1.19  1.19 
  managers  50 33    37 32    31  32    0.4  2   6668  6983    2.49  2.35 
  apprenticeship  44 32    45 35    49  40    7  5   1649  1691    0.62  0.57 
                                
  Within-group                              
  inequality  47 48    48 52    53  64                 
  between-group                              
  inequality  14 26    14 29    15  34                 
                                
D                                
  North  58  75    59  82   67  99   62  63   2703 2997    1.01  1.01 
  Centre  63 82    64 89    71  106    18  18    2678  3022    1.00  1.02 
  South  68  66    66  71   70  83   20  19   2584 2871    0.97  0.96 
                                
  within-group                              
  inequality  61 74    62 81    68  97                 31 
  (1)  (2)    (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7) 
                                
  between-group                              
  inequality  0.2 0.2    0.2 0.2   0.2  0.2                  
                                
                                
E                                
  age 15-24  46  38    45  39   47  44   26  17   2115 2169    0.79  0.73 
  age 25-34  43  46    43  50   45  58   28  35   2663 2759    1.00  0.93 
  age 35-49  59  75    60  81   67  93   32  35   3001 3372    1.12  1.13 
  age 50-64  61 90    62 96    69  112    14  13    2981  3613    1.11  1.21 
                                
                                
  within-group                              
  inequality  51 60    52 68    59  84                 
  between-group                              
  inequality  10  14    9 14    9  13                
                                
                                
F                                
  manufacturing  57  72    58  78   64  94   57  52   2653 2925    0.99  0.98 
  constructions  43  46    41  49   43  58   13  10   2722 2778    1.02  0.93 
  services  77 84    79 91    88  108    30  38    2694  3099    1.01  1.04 
                                
  within-group                              
  inequality  61 74    62 81    68  97                 
  between-group                              
  inequality  0 1    0 1    0  1                   
                                
Notes: See box 3 for the decomposition formulae. Due to rounding, the sum of within-group and between-group inequality may not exactly add up to total inequality. 
Illustrative example. Consider year 1985 and the gender decomposition (panel B in Table 8). Column 2 shows that total inequality (i.e. over all persons, in section A) is 61according 
to the index GE(0). When we disaggregate according to gender, we calculate that inequality in the same year and for the same index is 58 for men and 51 for women. The share of 
men and women in 1985 is 70 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively (column 5). Averaging inequality for men and for women, using these shares as weights, we obtain the within-
group inequality value of 56. To compute the between-group inequality, we first eliminate inequality within men (i.e. assign to each man the men’s mean earnings of reported in 
column 6) and inequality within women (i.e. assign to each woman the women’s mean earnings reported in column 6). The between-group value of 5 obtained in 1985 is the 





In this paper we have studied the Italian earnings distribution over the time period 1985-
1996, using administrative data from the Italian institute for social security (INPS). We have 
documented a slight, but not negligible, increase in earnings inequality, according to a battery 
of commonly used distributional indicators. Even though changes in computed inequality 
indices from one year to the next are small, their bootstrapped standard errors are small too, 
increasing our confidence in the statistical validity of the conclusions reached.  
 
The gap between the richest tenth and the poorest tenth broadened, but by less than what 
happened to the distance between the richest tenth of the distribution and the median. This 
could be explained by observing that the poorest tenth managed to reduce over time the 
distance between their position and that of the person in the median position. Concomitantly, 
the fact that the share of total earnings accruing to the bottom tenth of the employee 
population has increased, implies that we cannot speak of an unambiguous increase in 
inequality. We can therefore predicate a rise in earnings inequality only according to a - 
possibly large - subset of the available inequality measures. 
 
Decomposition of inequality indices by various population subgroups have followed, 
aimed at shedding light on the causes of the observed distributional changes. For all the 
population partitions used, inequality is mainly explained by its within-group component, 
which, in all cases, is increasing too.  
 
Male’s earnings are more unequally distributed than female’s, but the two groups are 
getting more similar to each other over time in terms of group’s share and mean earnings. 
Men’s inequality, though, is still growing faster than women’s. When focusing on low-pay, 
we find that the female’s poorest tenth displayed an impressive growth of 30% over the time 
period investigated, while the corresponding figure for men is a much more modest 6%. Not 
surprisingly, much of the reduction in the distance between the poorest tenth and median 
earnings in the whole distribution can be explained by this growth in the least well-paid jobs 
for females. 
 
Among occupations, white collars have the most unequal earnings distribution, with 
inequality growing fastest too, during the 1980s and 1990s. Inequality seems to have lowered 
for apprentices, but no unambiguous statement could be made about managers and blue 
collars. The between-group component was able to explain up to 36% of the observed 
inequality value. Moreover, this component has exhibited an impressive growth during the 
period 1985-1996, more than doubling its level. This may be seen as implying that the skills 
correlated with our occupation classification - e.g. education, which is not observable in our 
dataset - have increasingly attracted differential rate of returns in the labour market.  
 
The classic wage-age profile is found in our data, with monthly wages increasing as the 
employees grow older. The same pattern is revealed with respect to wage variability. Relative 
to the population mean, the mean of the youngest age group fell while for more senior 
employees the situation is reversed, suggesting that structural changes in the Italian labor 
market may have pushed the return to seniority and experience upwards. When we examine 
trends in inequality within each age subgroup, we witness to a widening of relative earnings 
differences in all but the youngest age group (due to the improved situation of very low wages 33 
in that group). Differences between age groups were able to account for between 13 and 19 
percent of observed total inequality, and have exacerbated during the 1990s.  
 
Modifications of the Italian industrial structure also contributed to the increase in earnings 
inequality. The share of manufacturing and constructions declined during the 1980s and 
1990s, while the share of employees in the services sector expanded. Manufacturing had the 
lowest relative mean earnings in 1985 and lost some additional grounds in 1996. Even more 
conspicuous was the reduction of relative mean earnings experienced by constructions, while 
the relative mean in services increased. The service sector was also found to be the one with 
higher inequality levels in both 1985 and 1996, followed by manufacturing and constructions. 
However, in terms of inequality growth, earnings differentials opened up faster in 
manufacturing, followed by constructions and services. Virtually all observed inequality was 
accounted for by the within-group component, with the between-group component that 
slightly increased its importance over time. 
 
Our decomposition by geographical areas pointed to a substantial uniformity in the 
distributions of monthly wages in the north, centre and south. It was noted that this result 
might be spurious, and mainly arising from the (mis)practice of southern firms to underreport 
the number of days worked by their employees. When focusing on annual earnings for year-
round workers, differences between the geographical areas of the countries re-emerge as 
expected, with the earnings distribution of the north lying almost everywhere to the right of 
those of the centre and the south. Differences are even more pronounced when considering 
annual earnings for all workers (year-round or not), with the greater concentration of low 
remuneration in the south of the country than in the north increasing correspondingly. As this 
latter measure of earnings conflates both wage variability and quantity of labor variability, the 
larger gap between the north and the south it produces is not surprising, simply reflecting the 
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